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Abstract. We provide the first anytime algorithm for find-
ing the -core in a nontransferable utility coalitional game. For
a given set of possible joint actions, our algorithm calculates ,
the maximum utility any agent could gain by deviating from
this set of actions. If  is too high, our algorithm searches for a
subset of the joint actions which leads to a smaller . Simula-
tions show our algorithm is more efficient than an exhaustive
search by up to 2 orders of magnitude.
1 Introduction
Coalitional games are an important tool in multi-agent sys-
tems and in AI in general. These games allow self-interested
agents to work together to achieve outcomes that could not
be achieved by a single agent, even when these agents have
different priorities. Coalition formation can be used in ap-
plications ranging from management of the smart grid or e-
marketplaces to communication networks [4, 5]. We can even
use coalition formation to improve disaster response: for ex-
ample, the lack of coordination between the thousands of aid
groups responding to the Haiti earthquake led to a slow and
chaotic response [10].
In many of these settings, we can assume the existence of
transferable utility (TU) [6]. The outcome achieved by a coali-
tion is some form of currency such as money, units of electric-
ity, or throughput on a network, that can be transferred from
one agent to another. Transferable utility can therefore be
seen as a useful tool for helping agents reach a consensus.
However, we are interested in settings where transferable
utility does not exist. When helping with disaster response,
for example, aid groups are (ideally) not making money from
saving lives, while coalitions in wireless networks may assign a
specific rate for each user in the coalition which is not transfer-
able [4]. These types of situations must instead be represented
by nontransferable utility (NTU) games. With these games,
the utility an agent receives from an outcome is completely
intrinsic to itself and cannot be shared. Without transferable
utility, reaching an agreement between agents can be consid-
erably more difficult.
For both TU and NTU games, a commonly considered so-
lution concept is the -core [6]. The -core consists of all par-
titions of agents along with an assigned action for each agent
such that no agent can increase its utility by more than 
by getting a coalition of agents to defect. While the core is
often empty, for a large enough , the -core will always be
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non-empty [6]. For TU games, there has been considerable
research on algorithms which can find the -core or other so-
lution concepts efficiently [3, 8, 9]. For NTU games, while
there has been work done on characterising when the core ex-
ists in NTU, there has not been any work done on efficiently
finding the -core [7].
Against this background, we present the first anytime al-
gorithm for efficiently finding a coalition structure and joint
action in the -core, for any  ≥ 0 such that the -core is
non-empty. Our algorithm is anytime in that it works by re-
peatedly finding the -core for smaller and smaller values of ,
until the desired  value is reached. With anytime algorithms,
it is possible to trade off computation time for solution qual-
ity; if finding; if finding the desired  proves to be too time-
consuming, we can terminate the algorithm early and take the
best  found so far. The anytime property creates an algorithm
which is more applicable to the real world. For example, in a
disaster response scenario agents may not have time to wait
around until the perfect solution is found.
In more detail, our algorithm is based on the idea of regret ;
the loss of utility a group of agents receive for accepting a
given joint action instead of choosing a different one. The goal
is to recommend a joint action which minimizes the regret for
all agents. If the resulting regret is less than , we have found
the -core. Since there is an exponential number of possible
joint actions, two challenges are how to efficiently calculate
regret and how to minimize it. To address both of these chal-
lenges, we build on two ideas from research into preference
elicitation: namely, minimax regret and utility independence
models.
The paper is presented as follows. We start by presenting
our model and reviewing related work. Next, we present our
algorithm and experimental results. Finally we conclude and
discuss future work.
2 Model and Related Work
2.1 Coalitional Game Theory
Our general setting is a coalition game with n agents in the
set N. An agent can be either a person, a specific group such
as an NGO, or a piece of software or hardware. Agent i has a
finite set of possible actions, Ai, to choose from. A coalition
p ⊆ N has a set of possible joint actions Ap = ×i∈pAi to choose
from. The set of actions over all agents is AN. A partition of
agents into a set of coalitions is known as a coalition structure.
Let p(CS, i) be the set of agents in the same coalition as
agent i (including itself) given the coalition structure CS. An
implementation ({p}, A{p}) is a set of disjoint coalitions and
a joint action for each of those coalitions.
Agent i’s preferences between joint actions is given by a
utility function ui : Ap(CS,i) → R. This utility is completely
internal to the agent and cannot be transferred from one agent
to another. The ordering of the preferences can be completely
different for every agent. An agent’s utility value is determined
only by the joint action which its coalition chooses, i.e. the
coalitions do not interact with each other.
A defecting implementation ({p}, A{p}) blocks the imple-
mentation (CS,A) (where p may or may not be in CS) if every
agent in p either prefers or is indifferent to ({p}, A{p}) over
(CS,A) and at least one agent in p strictly prefers ({p}, A{p}).
An implementation is in the core if no coalition of agents
wishes to defect from the implementation. Since the core may
be empty or difficult to find, we can also consider the -core [6].
An implementation is in the -core if it is blocked by a defect-
ing implementation but no agent in the defecting coalitions
increases their utility by more than . Note that since coali-
tions do not interact with each other, we need only consider
the possible defections and not the possible alternative imple-
mentations. For example, if there are two possible defections,
then if the first defection blocks the implementation it does so
regardless of whether the second defection occurs. This helps
since the number of possible defections may be considerably
less than the number of possible alternative implementations.
The goal of our work is to provide an algorithm which can
help a group of agents that are trying to find an implementa-
tion which they can all agree on. We consider a setting where
the agents approach a third party who will use our algorithm
to find the best possible implementation in a given amount
of time. This implementation is the default implementation;
agents agree to follow this implementation unless a coalition
of agents is willing to defect. The default implementation will
be in the -core, for some  ≥ 0. If  > 0, the agents will have
to decide if it is worth giving the third party additional time
to run our algorithm to try and reduce . We assume that all
agents truthfully report their utility values.
2.2 Preference Elicitation
Our algorithm searches for an implementation in the -core
by finding an implementation which minimizes regret. Regret
is the loss of utility an agent receives for accepting an imple-
mentation instead of defecting. Creating an algorithm based
on regret allows us to build on research from preference elici-
tation on how to efficiently calculate and how to minimize it.
We can illustrate the use of preference elicitation by consid-
ering a slightly altered coalition formation problem. Suppose
we have the mode from Section 2.1 but with an added user
who is able to decide on the actions taken by each agent. This
user has a utility function u : AN → R and will choose an ac-
tion which maximizes u, i.e. the user does not care about the
agents’ individual utilities.
In the worst case, the complexity of representing u is ex-
ponential with respect to the number of agents [1]. However,
we can often find a more compact representation of u. For
example, a common compact representation of u is additive
independence where we decompose u as
u(A) =
∑
i∈N
u(Ai), (1)
where u(Ai) : Ai → R is a utility function with respect to
only Ai [1]. The complexity of an additive independence rep-
resentation is linear.
Suppose additive independence holds and we are helping
the user choose between two joint actions A and A′. The
downside of additive independence is that we cannot choose
the best joint action merely by ordering Ai. Instead, choos-
ing the best joint action requires some information about the
actual values for u(Ai) [1]. A standard assumption in prefer-
ence elicitation is that, due to cognitive limitations, instead of
providing specific values for u(Ai), the user can only provide
lower and upper bounds [1].
Based on only these lower and upper bounds, we cannot cal-
culate which joint action maximizes the user’s utility. Rather,
a common alternative is to choose the joint action which min-
imizes the maximum possible regret or loss of utility. The
maximum regret for choosing A is
MR(A) = uupper(A′)− ulower(A)
where uupper(A′) is an upper bound on u(A′) and ulower(A)
is a lower bound on u(A). These upper and lower bounds
can be calculated using Equation 1 as well as the upper
and lower bounds for u(Ai) provided by the user. Suppose
that MR(A) = 0.3 and MR(A′) = 0.2. Now, Braziunas and
Boutilier argue that, if we know nothing else about the user’s
preferences, we should choose the joint action A′ since it
achieves the minimax regret [1]. Since minimax regret and
utility independence models are used in preference elicitation
to efficiently calculate and minimize regret, we believe there
is considerable value in adapting both of them for use with
calculating and minimizing regret in a coalition formation set-
ting.
3 The Algorithm
In this section we present our algorithm, Minimax Coalition
Formation (MCF). Our goal is to maximize the agents’ utility
values by finding an implementation that all agents can agree
to, i.e. no coalition of agents will wish to defect. If such an
implementation exists, it is in the core. Since the core may
be empty or may be impractical to find, we also consider the
goal of finding an implementation that is in the -core for a
small value of . Our algorithm can be stopped at any time
and will return the best implementation found so far. With
enough time, our algorithm will find an implementation in the
-core for any  such that the -core is nonempty. Our main
contribution is achieving these goals by adapting minimax
regret for use with coalition formation.
Our first step is to redefine regret in terms of coalition for-
mation. We begin by defining an agent’s regret for accepting
a given implementation instead of defecting.
Definition 1 (Individual Pairwise Regret). Individual pair-
wise regret is the loss of utility that agent i receives from ac-
cepting the implementation (CS,A) instead of the defecting
implementation ({p}, A′{p}), i.e.,
PR(i, (CS,A), (p,A′p)) = ui(p,A
′
p)− ui(CS,A).
For brevity, we will omit CS and p.
2
For example, if PR(i, A,A′p) > 0, then agent i strictly
prefers the implementation (p,A′p) over (CS,A). However,
agent i can only defect to (p,A′p) if all the other agents in
p also strictly prefer (p,A′p) or are at least indifferent. Oth-
erwise at least one agent in p will block the defection. This
leads to the idea of a feasible defection.
Definition 2 (Feasible defection). The defecting implemen-
tation ({p}, A′{p}) is feasible with respect to (CS,A) if
min
i∈p
PR(i, A,A′p) ≥ 0,
that is, all agents in p prefer (p,A′p) over (CS,A) or are at
least indifferent.
Using the idea of a feasible defection, we can generalize
pairwise regret from one agent to a coalition.
Definition 3 (Coalition Pairwise Regret). The coalition pair-
wise regret for the coalition of agents p with respect to the
implementation (CS,A) versus (p,A′) is
PR(A,A′p)
=
{
maxi∈p PR(i, A,A′p) if mini∈p PR(i, A,A
′
p) ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
As a result, the coalition pairwise regret is zero as long as at
least one agent in p objects to the defection.
We next generalize pairwise regret to being with respect to
the set of joint actions Ap and use this generalization to de-
termine if (CS,A) is in the -core. For notational brevity, in
the remainder of this paper, we assume that only the coalition
p is threatening to defect. The generalization to multiple de-
fections is straightforward. Indeed, our experimental results
examine this general case.
Definition 4 (Pairwise regret). For the implementation
(CS,A) and possible defection by the coalition p with the set
of possible joint actions Ap, the pairwise regret is
PR(A,Ap) = max
A′p∈Ap
PR(A,A′p).
Lemma 1. The implementation (CS,A) is in the -core if
and only if PR(A,Ap) ≤ .
Proof omitted for brevity.
Since p can choose its joint action after we have picked A,
we must pick a joint action which minimizes the worst-case
possible regret that could be caused by p. In this case, the
optimal joint action to choose is
Aopt(CS, p) = arg min
A∈A
PR(A,Ap),
and the corresponding best worst case regret is
ropt(CS, p) = min
A∈A
PR(A,Ap).
Unfortunately, calculating ropt (or finding Aopt) requires
an exhaustive search of A and Ap. This is because calculating
ropt requires finding the worst case defection which all agents
agree to, which in the worst case may require an exhaustive
search. We address this problem by instead using an upper
bound on ropt based on relaxed pairwise regret.
Definition 5 (Relaxed Pairwise Regret). For the implemen-
tation (CS,A) and defecting implementation ({p}, A′{p}), the
relaxed pairwise regret
PR+(A,A′p) = max
i∈p
PR(i, A,A′p).
That is, the relaxed regret is the maximum regret over all
agents in p, regardless of whether or not all agents would agree
to the joint action A′p. We can similarly define the relaxed
pairwise regret with respect to Ap as
PR+(A,Ap) = max
A′p∈Ap
PR+(A,A′p).
Since PR+ ≥ PR, PR+ is always a valid upper bound
on the possible regret. Thus, trying to minimize PR+ is a
reasonable alternative to trying to minimize PR. However, as
the following derivation shows, we encounter another problem
when trying to efficiently minimize regret:
min
A∈A
PR+(A,Ap)
= min
A∈A
max
A′p∈Ap
max
i∈p
PR(i, A,A′p)
= min
A∈A
max
i∈p
max
A′p∈Ap
PR(i, A,A′p)
= min
A∈A
max
i∈p
max
A′p∈Ap
[
ui(p,A
′
p)− ui(CS,A)
]
= min
A∈A
max
i∈p
[
max
A′p∈Ap
ui(p,A
′
p)− ui(CS,A)
]
Since miny maxx f(x, y) 6= maxx miny f(x, y), we cannot fur-
ther simplify this equation. To overcome this, we consider a
relaxed goal of finding an upper bound on the optimal regret
using maximum regret.
Definition 6 (Maximum regret). Given a coalition structure
CS, the maximum regret is
MR(A,Ap) = max
A∈A
PR+(A,Ap). (2)
Calculating the maximum regret is straightforward:
MR(A,Ap) = max
A∈A
max
A′p∈Ap
max
i∈p
PR(i, A,A′p)
= max
A∈A
max
i∈p
[
max
A′p∈Ap
ui(p,A
′
p)− ui(CS,A)
]
= max
i∈p
[
max
A′p∈Ap
ui(p,A
′
p)−min
A∈A
ui(CS,A)
]
Using additive independence from Equation 1 we can further
simplify this equation so that it can be calculated efficiently.
Letting A′p,j be the action for agent j in A
′
p:
MR(A,Ap) = max
i∈p
 max
A′p∈Ap
∑
j∈p
u(A′p,j)−min
A∈A
∑
j∈p(CS,i)
u(Aj)

= max
i∈p
∑
j∈p
max
Aj∈Aj
u(Aj)−
∑
j∈p(CS,i)
min
Aj∈Aj
u(Aj)
 . (3)
Since Equation 3 is maximizing over the sets of actions for
each agent as opposed to over all joint actions, Equation 3
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can be calculated in polynomial time even when there is an
exponential number of possible joint actions.
We calculate the maximum regret for every possible coali-
tion structure. The coalition structure with the lowest max-
imum regret is the minimax coalition structure (CS∗) and
the corresponding regret is the minimax regret (MMR). We
should choose this coalition structure since it guarantees the
lowest worst-case regret. If MMR ≤ , then any implemen-
tation based on CS∗ will result in the maximum regret being
less than or equal to . If  is below some desired threshold, we
can save considerable time by not having to figure out which
joint action gives the best implementation, since all will work.
If  is too large, we reduce it by using our algorithm Mini-
max Coalition Formation (MCF). Our first step is defining a
relaxation of (joint) actions, (joint) partial actions.
Definition 7 ((Joint) Partial Actions). A joint partial action
Jp ⊆ Ap is given by
Jp = ×i∈pJi,
where Ji ⊆ Ai is a partial action.
Given a joint partial action J ⊆ A and a set of joint partial
actions Jp over Ap, we can define a generalization of maximum
regret (Equation 2):
MR(J, Jp) = max
A∈J
max
Jp∈Jp
max
A′p∈Jp
PR+(A,A′p). (4)
For example, our original definition of maximum regret can
be written as MR(A, {Ap}). Similarly to Equation 3, we can
calculate Equation 4 in polynomial time with respect to the
number of partial joint actions in Jp.
A preliminary step in decreasing the maximum regret is to
make sure that we only consider the Pareto optimal joint ac-
tions in J . A Pareto optimal joint action is one which cannot
be changed in any way without decreasing the utility for at
least one agent. If A ∈ J is not a Pareto optimal joint ac-
tion, then there is at least one joint action in J which every
agent either strictly prefers over A or is indifferent to. As a
result, including A in J can increase the maximum regret.
With additive independence, we can use joint partial actions
to efficiently express all Pareto optimal joint actions. If we let
APON be the set of all Pareto optimal actions and APOi be the
set of Pareto optimal actions with respect to Ai then
APON = ×i∈NAPOi . (5)
Proof omitted for brevity. The set of Pareto optimal joint
actions is thus a joint partial action. As a result, we decrease
the maximum regret by setting J in Equation 4 to Equation
5.
Decreasing the maximum regret means refining either J
or Jp in Equation 4. MCF refines J and Jp using two meth-
ods, action branching and defection pruning, respectively. Ac-
tion branching splits J into smaller joint partial actions and
chooses the subset which minimizes Equation 4. Defection
pruning removes joint actions in Jp which do not lead to fea-
sible defections.
MCF uses a search tree to find the lowest possible max-
imum regret. An example search tree is shown in Figure 1
where some coalition structure CS where n = 3 and we are
concerned with a possible defection of p = {1, 2}. There will
A : J = A1 × A2 × A3
Jp = {A1 × A2}
B : J = Aleft1 × A2 × A3
Jp = {A1 × A2}
C : J = Aright1 × A2 × A3
Jp = {A1 × A2}
D : J = Aright1 × A2 × A3
Jp = {A1 ×A2, (A1, A′2)}
Figure 1: An example of a search tree for the coalition struc-
ture CS against a possible defection by agents 1 and 2. Nodes
B and C were created using an action branch, as shown in Al-
gorithm 1, on A. Node D was created using defection pruning,
as shown in Algorithm 2, on node C.
Algorithm 1 Action Branching Algorithm
Choose node (J, Jp) to split
Choose agent i and split Ji into J
right
i and J
left
i
Create child nodes (Jrighti ×Jj 6=i, Jp) and (J lefti ×Jj 6=i, Jp)
Use defection pruning on both child nodes
be one search tree for each possible coalition structure. Each
node is identified by the tuple (J, Jp). The root node, Node
A in Figure 1 is (A, {Ap}). Our first method for reducing the
maximum regret, an action branch, shown in Algorithm 1,
simply splits J into two smaller joint partial actions. For ex-
ample, in Figure 1, Nodes B and C are created by an action
branch on the root node, A.
There are many possible heuristics that can be used to
choose which node to split and how to split it. We used a
simple greedy heuristic which always branched the minimax
node and split a joint partial action by the partial action cor-
responding to the the greatest utility range over all agents. In
a few cases, with this approach our algorithm would become
stuck and additional iterations of our algorithm would not
decrease the minimax regret. We identified such cases when
the minimax regret had not decreased after a certain number
of iterations. Then we would branch on the node with the
second lowest maximum regret.
After each action branch, we use defection pruning on both
child nodes to remove infeasible joint actions from Jp. Con-
sider, for example, Node C in Figure 1 where Jp = {A1×A2}.
Suppose that
(A′1, A
′
2) = arg max
(A1,A2)∈{A1×A2}
MR(J, {(A1, A2)}),
that is, the joint action (A′1, A
′
2) maximizes MR(J, Jp). But
if either agent 1 or agent 2 objects to (A′1, A
′
2), then it will
not result in a feasible defection. This means that MR(J, Jp)
may be an overestimation. If this is the case, we can lower
MR(J, Jp) by removing (A′1, A′2) from Jp. The first step in de-
fection pruning is to decompose Jp in such a way that (A′1, A′2)
is isolated. For example, if A1 = {A1, A′1} and A2 = {A2, A′2},
then we can decompose Jp as {A1 × A2, (A1, A′2), (A′1, A′2)}.
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Algorithm 2 Defection Pruning Algorithm
Require: Node (J, Jp)
loop
Awp = maxJp∈Jp arg maxAp∈Jp MR(J, {(A)})
Split Jp into (Awp ) ∪ J′p
if mini maxA∈J PR(i, A,Awp ) < 0 then
Remove Awp from Jp {There is at least one agent who
will always object to Awp }
else
Break
end if
end loop
If (A′1, A
′
2) is not feasible, we remove it from Jp (as demon-
strated in Figure 1) and repeat this process until no more
joint partial actions can be pruned.
After we have split a node and pruned both of its children,
we then search for a node which minimizes the maximum
regret. This node is called the minimax node and the corre-
sponding joint partial action offers the lowest maximum regret
found so far for the given coalition structure. Since splitting
and pruning will never increase the minimax regret, we only
need to search through the leaf nodes to find the minimax
node. The overall minimax regret is the lowest minimax re-
gret over all coalition structures. The corresponding coalition
structure and joint partial action give the best implementa-
tion found so far. Since we can stop MCF after any iteration
and go with the best implementation yet found, MCF is an
anytime algorithm.
4 Experimental Results
We next present our experimental results. While the theory
presented in the previous section allows for arbitrary coali-
tions, for our experiments we wanted to consider scenarios
that could be plausible in real-world examples. In the real
world, many possible coalitions may be unable to form: for
example, communication infrastructure limitations may limit
the maximum size of coalitions or geographical constraints
may prevent specific agents from working together. To model
such situations, we rely on the language for constrained coali-
tion formation provided by Rahwan et. al. [9]. The basic
form of this language models constraints on the individual
coalitions, as opposed to constraints over the whole coalition
structure. We used constrained coalition formation to create
tractable test cases where only coalitions of a specific size are
allowed to form.
To demonstrate the difficulty of finding the -core, we began
with a simulation consisting of 4 agents, each with 5 possible
actions, and only coalitions of size 2 allowed. For each coali-
tion structure, there are 4 possible defecting coalitions (it is
possible for different defections to result in the same coalition
structure); these settings result in 1875 possible implemen-
tations and for each implementation, 100 possible defecting
implementations. For this scenario, as well as all subsequent
ones, we tested 100 cases to help ensure statistical signifi-
cance of the results. Due to a lack of alternative algorithms
to compare ours against, our benchmark algorithm was an
exhaustive search (for brevity, the details of the exhaustive
search are omitted). Figure 2 shows the -core versus the me-
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Figure 2: The median number of iterations to reach a given
minimax regret or  value for both an exhaustive search and
our MCF algorithm.
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Figure 3: The median number of iterations to find an im-
plementation in the core as the number of actions per agent
varies for both an exhaustive search and our MCF algorithm.
dian number of iterations of the exhaustive search. Note the
logarithmic x axis. The results, as well as subsequent ones,
showed a heavy-tailed distribution since the difficult test cases
tended to be especially difficult. As a result, all of our figures
show the median instead of the mean since the median is more
robust against outliers. Our error ranges were calculated us-
ing median absolute deviation, the median absolute difference
from the median, which is also robust against outliers. Even
in this simple setting, the exhaustive search takes, on average,
almost 8000 iterations to find an implementation in the core.
We also see that initially  decreases quickly, while later on
the decrease is much slower. This slowing down is due to the
nature of random sampling; the smaller  is the more itera-
tions are needed to decrease it. For this initial simulation, as
well as the subsequent ones, for roughly 1% to 2% of the test
cases, the core was empty. Given the low percentages, these
test cases were ignored.
We next ran MCF in the same setting. Since the majority of
the work in our algorithm is done by the pruning, we counted
the number of iterations for our algorithm by the number of it-
erations of the defection pruning method. We identified MCF
as being stuck if the minimax regret had not decreased after
10 iterations. The results are also shown in Figure 2. As with
the exhaustive search, with our algorithm the minimax regret
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Figure 4: The median number of iterations to find an imple-
mentation in the -core for  = 0.05 as the number of agents
varies using the MCF algorithm.
initially decreases very quickly but with additional iterations
the rate of decrease slows. This is because as joint partial
actions get smaller, the range of utility values they give gets
smaller. Thus, action branches on smaller joint partial actions
will produce child nodes with similar maximum regret values,
which slows the decrease in the maximum regret.
Our algorithm provides a substantial increase in efficiency
over the exhaustive search. For larger values of , our algo-
rithm can find an implementation in the -core 8 times faster.
This difference only increases for smaller values of : on av-
erage, our algorithm finds an implementation in the core 23
times faster than the exhaustive search.
We next examined how both of these algorithms fared as
we increased the number of actions per agent. Figure 3 shows
the median number of iterations for both algorithms to find
the core versus the number of actions per agent. Note the log
axis on the y axis. While the average number of iterations
increases for both algorithms, the number of iterations for
our algorithm remains significantly below that needed for an
exhaustive search. More importantly, the difference in per-
formance between the two algorithms increases. While our
algorithm is initially 23 times faster, at its best it is over 130
times faster. This shows that our algorithm is better able to
handle an increase in complexity.
Finally, we examined how our algorithm performed as we
increased the number of agents. We examined a setting where
coalitions were only of size 2 and each agent had 20 possible
actions. Figure 4 shows the median number of iterations for
MCF to find the -core for =0.05 versus the number of agents.
We see that increasing from 6 to 8 agents results in a substan-
tial increase in the number of iterations. This is due mostly
to the increase in the number of possible coalition structures.
With 6 agents, we have 15 possible coalition structures which
gives an average of 84 iterations per coalition structure. With
8 agents, we have 105 possible coalition structures giving an
average of 109 iterations per coalition structure. Thus, for
each individual coalition structure, our algorithm scales very
well despite the number of joint actions increasing by a fac-
tor of 400. With 4 agents, our algorithm was unsuccessful 2%
of the time, with 6 agents 5% of the time and with 8 agents
20% of the time. Our algorithm is thus able to solve the vast
majority of the test cases with 8 agents efficiently despite hav-
ing over 2.6 · 1012 possible implementations and over 11,000
possible defecting implementations.
5 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to help a group of agents coordinate
in such a way that each agent maximized their own utility
by efficiently finding an implementation in the -core. Our
algorithm is an anytime algorithm; if finding the -core for a
specific  turned out to be too time-consuming, our algorithm
can terminate and return the best  found so far. For any 
such that the -core is nonempty, our algorithm will eventually
find an implementation in that -core. We achieved these goals
by minimizing regret and adapting methods from preference
elicitation.
There are many interesting possibilities for expanding on
this work. One goal is developing better heuristics for helping
to select and split nodes during an action branch. Another
goal is dealing with the quickly growing number of coalition
structures. Since coalition structures may have many coali-
tions in common, there may be possibilities for increasing
efficiencies. Building on the work done on constrained coali-
tion formation would allow our algorithm to scale efficiently
with even more complex coalitions [9]. Finally, we would like
to generalize our setting by examining other utility indepen-
dence models such as generalized additive independence or the
model proposed by Deng and Papadimitriou [1, 2].
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